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Conclusion
A variety of routes of accountability have been set
out but the one that a healthcare worker practicing
within the UK is most likely to face is the NHS
complaints procedure. As from April 1996 this has
almost certainly achieved the purpose of providing
a thorough investigation of the issues raised, albeit
not always to the complete satisfaction of the com-
plainant. However, the new proposed changes are
intended to address reservations expressed by com-
plainants, especially about the independent review
process.
The previous confrontational and legalistic process
has by and large been dispensed with and, although
there are still inherent delays in the system, partic-
ularly in the hospital sector, the complainant is usual-
ly able to obtain a better understanding of the medical
management of his/her care that is within the ethos
of clinical governance, allowing doctors to learn
from adverse events in order that their practice
might subsequently be improved.
Of course, there continue to be safeguards for soci-
ety, generally where that healthcare worker’s conduct
may be so serious that regulatory body intervention is
justified or his/her performance is so seriously defi-
cient that it is necessary for this to be examined. The
system has now been underpinned by the CHRE in
order to retain public confidence.
There is no doubt that self-regulation is one of the
hallmarks of a profession but the emphasis now is
very much that of professionally led regulation, but
with a significant lay input, in order to avoid the all-
too-prevalent criticism that culminated in an expo-
nential rise in complaints. It appears that the new
changes are starting to work in that complaints
are no longer rising but society does require an effec-
tive legislative backstop to maintain progress in the
face of public concern.
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Introduction
Computers can be involved in a crime in three gen-
eral ways: (1) as a target; (2) as an instrument; (3) and
as a source of evidence. Unauthorized access, theftof services, and other offenses defined in many com-
puter crime laws focus on computers as targets. In the
past, the term computer crime was associated with
this limited set of offenses, but as computer use
becomes more prevalent in society, computers are
becoming involved in a wider range of crimes and
the term computer crime is assuming a broader
meaning.
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of criminal activity, including terrorism, organized
crime, stalking, and child exploitation. For example,
sex offenders and obsessional harassers use compu-
ters to threaten and control victims, making the com-
puter an instrument of the crime. In addition, due to
the nature of digital data and a computer’s storage of
it, computers can contain evidence relating to crimes.
For instance, serial killer Maury Roy Travis sent a
letter to a newspaper with a map that showed where
a victims’ body could be found. Travis was tracked
down via a ‘cybertrail’ comprised of a unique number
printed on the map, associated web server access logs,
and internet dial-up records that were generated
when he connected to the internet to download the
map from an online travel website. Investigators
searched Travis’ home and found incriminating evi-
dence, including victims’ blood and videotapes
showing a number of the victims being tortured and
killed.
The scope of computer crime becomes even
broader with the proliferation of mobile devices and
equipment with built-in computers such as personal
digital assistants, mobile telephones, and computers
embedded in cars. A personal digital assistant can
contain significant details about a victim or an offen-
der’s life and activities. These data are potentially
retrievable by others. A mobile telephone can reveal
which telephone numbers an individual called or was
called from at particular times. Additionally, it may
be possible to ascertain the locations of a victim and
likely suspect, leading up to a violent crime based on
the locations of their mobile telephones. Sensing and
diagnostic modules in cars – analogous to the black
box on an airliner, recording data such as vehicle
speed, brake status, and throttle position during the
last five seconds before an impact – are used to inves-
tigate automobile accidents.
For forensic purposes, it is generally not computers
themselves that are of primary interest but rather the
data they contain. Additionally, related data on net-
works such as the internet and mobile telephone sys-
tems can be useful in an investigation. The term
digital evidence is used to refer to any data stored or
transmitted using a computer that may have proba-
tive value. It may support or refute a hypothesis of
how an offense occurred or address critical elements
of an offense, such as intent or alibi. Given the current
ubiquity of digital evidence, it is a rare crime that does
not have some associated data stored on or transmit-
ted using computers. It is becoming routine for law
enforcement agencies to devote resources to forensic
examination of computers in most types of criminalinvestigation to seek related evidence on computers
and networks.Digital Crime Scene Investigation
When computers are an instrument of a crime or a
source of digital evidence, it is useful to think of them
as secondary crime scenes. Like a physical crime
scene, digital crime scenes can contain many pieces
of evidence and it is necessary to apply the same pro-
cesses to preserve, document, and search the scene. In
addition, Locard’s exchange principle applies to the
digital realm, helping investigators establish continu-
ity of offense and track down criminals. According to
Locard’s exchange principle, when two entities (e.g.,
objects, people, locations) come into contact during
the commission of a crime, an exchange of evidence
occurs. Despite their best efforts to conceal or destroy
incriminating digital evidence, criminals who use
computers often leave behind digital traces that are
useful in an investigation. In past homicide cases,
victims’ computers contained evidence that led to
the murders and evidence on offenders’ computers
revealed their intent to kill.
In the UK case involving Dr. Harold Shipman,
changes he made to computerized medical records
on his practice computer system were instrumental
in convicting him of killing hundreds of patients.
Following Shipman’s arrest, police made an exact
copy of the hard drive from his computer, thus pre-
serving a complete and accurate duplicate of the digi-
tal evidence. By analyzing the computer application
Shipman used to maintain patient records, investiga-
tors found that the program kept an audit trail, re-
cording changes made to patient records. This audit
trail indicated that Shipman had lied about patients’
symptoms and made backdated modifications to
records to conceal the murders. During his trial Ship-
man claimed that he was familiar with this audit trail
feature and was sufficiently knowledgeable about
computers to falsify the audit trail if he had actually
been trying to hide these activities. However, the
court was convinced that Shipman had altered
the records to conceal his crimes and sentenced him
to life in prison.
Attributing computer activities to a particular indi-
vidual can be challenging. Digital evidence can pro-
vide a circumstantial link between a person and
activities on a computer, but it can be difficult to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime. For instance, logs showing that
a particular internet account was used to commit a
crime do not prove that the owner of that account
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the individual’s account. Attributing a crime to an
individual becomes even more difficult when a crime
is committed from a publicly accessible computer,
such as at an internet cafe or public-library terminal.
Using evidence from multiple independent sources
to corroborate each other and develop an accurate
picture of events can help develop a strong associa-
tion between an individual and computer activities. In
one stalking case, investigators did not have sufficient
evidence to prove that their prime suspect sent a
threatening e-mail from a public-library terminal.
Therefore, they had to interview witnesses, compare
the e-mail with letters that were mailed to the victims
by the suspect years earlier, and use other traditional
investigative techniques to build a solid case.
As another example, a man accused of possessing
child pornography argued that all evidence found in
his home should be suppressed because investigators
had not provided sufficient probable cause in their
search warrant to conclude that it was in fact he, and
not an imposter, who was using his internet account
to traffic in child pornography (US v. Grant, US
Court of Appeals, 1st Cir. 2000, available online at
http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/1st/992332.html). During
their investigation into an online child exploitation
group, investigators determined that one member of
the group had connected to the internet using a dial-
up account registered to Grant. Upon further investi-
gation, they found that Grant also had a high-speed
internet connection from his home that was used as a
FTP (File Transfer Protocol) server – the type of file-
transfer server required for membership in the child
exploitation group. Coincidentally, while tapping a
telephone not associated with Grant in relation to
another child pornography case, investigators ob-
served that one of the participants in a secret online
chat room was connected via Grant’s dial-up account.
Contemporaneous surveillance of the defendant’s
home revealed that his and his wife’s cars were both
parked outside their residence at the time. The court
felt that there was enough corroborating evidence to
establish a solid circumstantial connection between
the defendant and the crime to support probable
cause for the search warrant. Hence, using multiple
independent sources of evidence, it is possible to es-
tablish a solid circumstantial link between online
activities and an individual.A Developing Forensic Discipline
From a forensic standpoint, it is necessary to process
digital evidence in such a way that it will holdup under scrutiny in court. To address this need,
formal principles and methodologies have been devel-
oped for processing evidence from a wide range of
technologies.
Early approaches to processing digital evidence
were developed primarily by law enforcement, with
assistance from computer professionals, during
the late 1980s and early 1990s in the USA. A number
of new terms were created to describe this practice,
including computer forensics, forensic computer
analysis, and forensic computing. Also, new terms
like network forensics, internet forensics, and inci-
dent forensics were created to accommodate other
technologies. Although certain fundamental evi-
dence-handling principles were applied to computers
at this stage, such as maintaining chain of custody, no
formalized methodology was developed. The lack of
standards for how computers and networks were
handled as a source of evidence resulted in a lack of
consistency, making it more difficult for the practice
to develop into the generally accepted norms of a
forensic science discipline.
Several groups were formed to develop standards
and a more scientific approach to processing evi-
dence on computers and networks was established.
The International Organization of Computer Evi-
dence (IOCE) was established in the mid-1990s
‘‘to ensure the harmonization of methods and prac-
tices among nations and guarantee the ability to
use digital evidence collected by one state in the
courts of another state.’’ In 1998, the Scientific Work-
ing Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) was estab-
lished to ‘‘promulgate accepted forensic guidelines
and definitions for the handling of digital evidence.’’
As a result of these efforts, the American Society of
Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accredita-
tion Board (ASCLD/LAB) updated its accreditation
manual in 2003 to include standards and criteria for
‘‘digital evidence examiners’’ in US crime labora-
tories. There are similar efforts to develop digital
evidence examination into an accredited discipline
under international standards (ISO 17025).
Although the SWGDE developed guidelines for
training and best practices, it did not provide a solid
methodology that would enable the field to develop
into a science. In 2001, the first Digital Forensics
Research Work Shop (DFRWS) was held, bringing
together knowledgeable individuals from academia,
the military, and the private sector to advance the
field as a science. One outcome of this workshop
was a framework for processing digital evidence and
a suggested title for the field: ‘‘digital forensic sci-
ence.’’ Digital forensic science was defined as ‘‘the
Figure 1 A folder named ‘‘tk’’ contained important evidence
related to a computer intrusion investigation. The ‘‘tk’’ folder is
visible using a newer version of a digital evidence examination
tool (left), but not an older version containing a bug (right).
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toward preservation, collection, validation, identifi-
cation, analysis, interpretation, documentation,
and presentation of digital evidence derived from
digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or
furthering the reconstruction of events found to be
criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized
actions shown to be disruptive to planned opera-
tions.’’ The DFRWS workshop also led to the
creation of the International Journal of Digital Evi-
dence (IJDE), and later the Journal of Digital
Investigation.
The approach to processing digital evidence devel-
oped at the DFRWS was based on traditional meth-
ods of the forensic sciences and has focused attention
on forensic issues. For instance, more formalized
methods of processing computers and networks are
being developed that are modeled on physical crime-
scene investigation. Researchers and practitioners are
developing new techniques and tools for detecting,
tracking, and attributing computer crime. Specifica-
tions for digital evidence processing tools are being
developed to ensure that they address the needs of the
forensic science community. In addition, related areas
of expertise are emerging to deal with digital evidence
from different technologies (e.g., networks, mobile
telephones) and to perform specialized tasks (e.g.,
recovery of deleted or encrypted data, analysis of
computer programs).Digital Evidence
Because any crime can involve a computer, it is im-
portant to have a basic understanding of the kinds
of digital evidence that might be available. Addition-
ally, a familiarity with the fragility and limitations
of digital evidence will minimize the risk of mishand-
ling computers and damaging or misinterpreting the
evidence they contain.
At its basic level, digital evidence exists in a
physical medium such as a magnetic disk, a copper
wire, or a radio signal in the air. Forensic examiners
rarely scrutinize the physical medium and instead use
computers to translate the data into a form that
humans can interpret, such as text, audio, or video.
Therefore, examiners rarely see the actual data but
only a representation, and each layer of abstraction
can lose information and introduce errors. For
instance, analyzing the magnetic properties of a
hard drive may reveal additional information useful
for some investigations (e.g., overwritten data, the
cause of damage to the disk). The risk of examining
media at this low level is that the act of observing will
cause changes that could destroy or undermine the
evidence.In fact, it is considered best practice to examine
an exact replica of digital evidence to avoid alter-
ing the original. However, it can be difficult to obtain
an exact and complete copy of a magnetic disk,
random access memory (RAM), a copper wire, or a
radio signal. For instance, programmatic mistakes
(a.k.a. bugs) have been found in tools for collecting
digital evidence from hard drives, resulting in only
a portion of the data being copied. Bugs have
also been found in tools for examining digital
evidence on storage media, resulting in an inaccurate
representation of the underlying data, as shown in
Figure 1.
There are many other potential sources of error in
digital evidence between the time data are created by
a system and the time of preservation and analysis of
the evidence. For instance, system malfunction can
result in erroneous or missing log entries. In addition,
as with other forms of evidence, poor training or
lack of experience can lead forensic examiners to
mishandle or incorrectly interpret digital evidence.
The multiple layers of separation between a forensic
examiner and the original evidence can be problem-
atic from a forensic standpoint. The possibility that
important evidence was overlooked, misrepresented,
or misinterpreted leaves the door open for criticism
and reasonable doubt. To mitigate these risks, ex-
perienced digital evidence examiners do not base
their conclusions on the results of one tool. For
example, making copies of digital evidence with
more than one tool reduces the chance that portions
will not be collected. In addition, comparing results in
multiple tools and validating important findings at a
low level reduces the risks of misrepresentation and
misinterpretation.
The mutability of digital evidence is another foren-
sic concern. To demonstrate that digital evidence is an
exact replica of the original and has not been altered
since it was collected, it is common practice to
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the evidence prior to collection. For instance, consid-
er a letter found on a computer containing the sen-
tence ‘‘Jane, I want to kill you’’ that has an MD5 value
of 95a2592365b98fcac8c940de3d136943, as shown
here:
C:\>type letter
Jane, I want to kiss you
C:\>md5sum letter
95a2592365b98fcac8c940de3d136943 letter
By taking such precautions to document the origi-
nal state of the evidence, any changes in the evidence
can be detected quickly using the hash value. For
instance, if the aforementioned letter was altered to
contain the work ‘‘kill’’ instead of ‘‘kiss’’ this would be
reflected in the MD5 value as shown here:
C:\>type letter
Jane, I want to kill you
C:\>md5sum letter
ccdcd9ac77345491a6c10609dc3ad338 letter
Although the ephemeral nature of digital evidence
has been mentioned, one benefit of digital evidence is
that it can persist despite efforts to destroy it. For
instance, deletion and formatting often involve re-
moving higher-level ‘‘logical’’ references to the data
(e.g., file names, locations of data on disk) but leave
data on the physical medium. For instance, when a
hard drive containing a Microsoft FAT file system is
formatted, the file allocation table (FAT) is obliter-
ated but the data from files remain on the disk and
can be recovered. In addition to deleted files, other
remnants of data can be found on disks in the form of
RAM contents saved to disk by the operating system
and temporary files created by some applications.Figure 2 Fragment of a Microsoft Word document viewed in uninte
viewed normally.For instance, Microsoft Word creates temporary
files while a document is being edited, creating frag-
ments such as the one shown in uninterpreted form
(Figure 2).
Among other things, the data on line 4 in this
fragment show where the associated document was
located and what it was called (C:\Private\Secret1.
doc.pgp). The ‘‘.pgp’’ file extension suggests that the
original document was encrypted using a program
called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). This example
demonstrates the valuable lesson that, even if a docu-
ment was encrypted, it may be possible to recover
portions of its contents in unencrypted form.
The file fragment in Figure 2 also demonstrates
that a Microsoft Word document contains data that
are not visible when the file is printed or viewed
using Microsoft Word (a.k.a. metadata). In addition
to the original file location and name, these metadata
can include date–time stamps showing when the file
was created and last modified, and can even indi-
cate which computer was used to create the file, and
the last ten authors of the document. For instance, the
global unique identifier (GUID) value on the last line
in Figure 2 suggests that the document was created on
a computer containing a 3COM Ethernet network
interface card with address ‘‘00-10-4B-DE-FC-E9.’’
Because each network interface card is assigned a
unique address, this information is very useful for
identifying the source computer. Notably, newer ver-
sions of Microsoft Word do not include this address
in the GUID value and knowledgeable computer
users can alter this address on their computers. If the
metadata in a suicide note indicate that it was created
after the victim died on a computer other than the
victim’s, this could indicate that someone else wrote
the note.rpreted form showing metadata not visible when file is printed or
Figure 3 Metadata in photograph from a digital camera extracted using a tool called ACDSee. The metadata includes a time–date
stamp created when the photograph was taken. In this instance, the date and time are inaccurate because the camera’s clock was not
set correctly – this photograph was actually taken in April 2003.
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Characteristics
Increasingly, offenders are becoming aware of the
risks associated with using computers and are taking
precautions to conceal their identities and destroy
incriminating digital evidence. For instance, some
offenders use anonymous internet services to make
it more difficult for investigators to find them. Con-
sider a harassment case in which the offender sends
the victim threatening e-mail via an intermediate serv-
er. Normally the e-mail message would contain infor-
mation about the computer used to send the message.
Specifically, the e-mail header would contain the in-
ternet protocol (IP) address of the sender’s computer
(every computer on the internet is assigned an IP
address to enable delivery of data). However, because
the harasser sent the message via an intermediate
server, the e-mail header will contain the IP address
of that server, thus concealing the actual source. For
example, headers in the following e-mail sent from a
Yahoo! account indicate that the message was sent
from an IP address in Japan (210.249.120.210):
To: Count Rugen
From: ‘‘Inigo Montoya’’ <inigo_montoya@yahoo.com >
X-Originating-IP: 210.249.120.210
Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2003 03:51:45-0000
Subject: Prepare to die!
However, the sender merely connected to Yahoo!
via this computer in Japan. Therefore, additionalinvestigation would be required to determine the ac-
tual source of the message. Log files from the inter-
mediate computer, such as those shown below, might
contain the IP address of the actual sender’s computer
(172.16.34.14 in this example):
172.16.34.14, anonymous, 6/4/03, 03:43:24,
210.249.120.210, GET,
http://mailsrv.yahoo.com/login.html, 200








172.16.34.14, anonymous, 6/4/03, 03:51:36,
210.249.120.210, GET,
http://mailsrv.yahoo.com/inigo_montoya/sent.html, 200
Similarly, it is not safe to assume that a file origi-
nated on the computer that it is found on, since it
could have been created elsewhere and transferred via
a network or cable. Additional investigation is re-
quired to determine the actual source of a network
connection or piece of digital evidence. In the case of
an IP address, the continuity of offense must be estab-
lished, linking the offender to the crime. In the case of
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used to assess the source. As an example, Figure 3
shows metadata extracted from a photograph taken
with a Kodak DX3900 digital camera.
These metadata could be used to demonstrate that
a photograph was likely taken using a suspect’s cam-
era, disproving a claim that he downloaded the file
from the internet.
If these kinds of metadata are not available in
a digital photograph, it may be possible to use other
characteristics of a photograph to determine its
source. For instance, Europol’s Excalibur system uses
image recognition technology to search a database of
photographs from past investigations for similarities
with a given image. If two photographs contain a
common component such as a piece of fabric with
a distinct design, this may indicate that they were
taken in the same place, providing investigators with
a lead.
Summary
As computers become more integrated in people’s
daily lives, investigators are encountering an increas-
ing amount of evidence of witness, victim, and crimi-
nal activity in digital form. Even traditional crimes
such as homicide and rape can involve digital evidence
either directly or incidentally. Something as simple as
a murder victim’s personal diary on her computer can
influence victimology, providing deep insight into her
life and the people she interacted with, including the
perpetrator and other victims of a serial homicide. In
addition, digital evidence on computers and networks
has helped identify and apprehend offenders in mur-
der cases. Although some offenders take precautions
to conceal, manipulate, or destroy digital evidence,
sources may exist of which the offender was not
aware or had no control over, particularly when net-
works are involved. An awareness of the kinds of data
that may exist (e.g., deleted files, logs, metadata) and
the inherent limitations (e.g., abstraction, mutable,
evaluation of source) can help investigators make use
of digital evidence.
There is a growing need for reliable methods and
trained experts to process digital evidence as it is usedin more criminal investigations. Efforts are being
made to craft standards of practice and develop this
field into a fully-fledged forensic discipline. One such
endeavor is to develop a generally accepted training
and certification process to help ensure that a crime
scene expert who collects digital evidence, a forensic
examiner who processes the recovered evidence, and
an investigator who analyzes the evidence would all
be applying the same principles and standards in their
activities, written reports, and in court testimony.
Additionally, tools for processing digital evidence
are being tested to identify bugs that could intro-
duce errors in the collection or examination stages.
Training, standards development, and tool-testing
initiatives must keep pace with advances in com-
puter technology, making digital forensics an exciting
and rapidly evolving field.See Also
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